Emergency Procedures

Five elements, per the ACS (VII.A S1–S5):

• S1: explain or describe an emergency procedure for a situation the evaluator hands you
• S2: use proper procedures for a situation such as emergency descent, inflight fire and smoke, decompression, emergency evacuation, airframe icing, or anything else the AFM/POH calls out
• S3: fly on standby, backup, or partial-panel instrumentation if the scenario calls for it
• S4: coordinate with your crew and finish the checklist in a timely manner
• S5: talk to ATC and the evaluator as the situation warrants

Note the ordering. The ACS asks for procedures first and checklists "in a timely manner" — not instantly. Memory items, then control, then the book.

Whenever performing it for real would jeopardize safety. Appendix 2 of the ACS says plainly: "If performing aspects of a given maneuver, such as emergency procedures, would jeopardize safety, the evaluator will ask the applicant to simulate that portion of the maneuver" (FAA-S-ACS-11A, Appendix 2). That is why decompression is never demonstrated by actually dumping the cabin, and why fire drills are described rather than lit.

Memory items first, then the checklist: the ACS anticipates that reading the actual checklist may be impractical or unsafe in some situations, so the evaluator assesses your performance of published or recommended immediate-action memory items, followed by your review of the appropriate checklist once conditions permit (FAA-S-ACS-11A, Appendix 2).

So the sequence an examiner wants to see is: fly the airplane, memory items, stabilize, then call for the checklist and run it deliberately. Reaching for a QRH before the airplane is under control is a failure of prioritization, not diligence.

• 91.3(b) — in an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action, the PIC may deviate from any rule of part 91 to the extent required to meet that emergency. A written report goes to the Administrator upon request (91.3(c)).
• 121.557(a) — in an emergency requiring immediate decision and action, the PIC may take any action considered necessary, deviating from prescribed procedures, weather minimums, and the chapter, to the extent required in the interests of safety.
• 121.557(c) — you must keep ATC and dispatch fully informed of the progress of the flight, and the person who declared sends a written report through the certificate holder's operations manager to the Administrator. A PIC files within 10 days after returning to home base; a dispatcher within 10 days of the emergency.

The 121 report is not conditional on a request the way the 91.3 report is. That distinction gets asked.

The aircraft dispatcher. Under 121.557(b), when an emergency arises in flight that requires immediate decision and action by the dispatcher and is known to them, the dispatcher must advise the PIC, ascertain the PIC's decision, and have that decision recorded. If the dispatcher cannot communicate with you, the dispatcher declares the emergency and takes whatever action is considered necessary (121.557(b)). Joint responsibility is the defining feature of domestic and flag operations — you are never the only person with a duty to act.

Any situation demanding an immediate and rapid descent — the AFH names an uncontrollable fire, a sudden loss of cabin pressurization, or any other comparable emergency (AFH ch. 18). The objective is to descend as soon and as rapidly as possible while not exceeding any structural limitation of the airplane (AFH ch. 18).

At transport-category weights and altitudes, add a trigger the AFM will drive: loss of both engines or a fuel emergency where you need to reach a glide-range airport. In every case the descent is a memory-item maneuver, and the target altitude comes from the terrain along your route, not from a generic number.

Per AFH ch. 18, and always subject to what the manufacturer publishes:

1. Configure for drag — power to idle (except where the manufacturer prohibits), propeller control to low pitch/high rpm if equipped, landing gear and flaps extended as recommended
2. Bank about 30 to 45° when initiating, to maintain positive load factors (G forces) on the airplane — that is the AFH's stated reason for the bank. Separately, the AFH has simulated emergency descents in training made in a turn to check for traffic below and to look for a possible emergency landing area, with a radio call announcing descent intentions as appropriate
3. Respect the speed limits — do not exceed VNE, VLE, or VFE as applicable; if the air is turbulent, honor VA as well
4. Descend at the maximum allowable airspeed consistent with the procedure used, for maximum drag and rate of descent
5. Begin recovery high enough to ensure a safe return to level flight or a precautionary landing

In practice the transport-category version is thrust levers to idle, speedbrakes, a turn off the airway, and a descent flown on the flight director to the AFM target — but the aerodynamic logic above is what the examiner wants explained.

In order:

1. Mask on — within five seconds or less, and check for flow (AC 61-107, Table 2-6, Common Emergency Procedures for Hypoxia — the same response para 2-7 applies to decompression)
2. Breathe 100 percent oxygen
3. Establish crew communication and confirm the other pilot is on oxygen
4. Initiate the emergency descent to a safe altitude — preferably below 10,000 ft MSL
5. If symptoms persist, land as soon as possible (AC 61-107, para 2-7; the table's own wording is "LAND A.S.A.P.")

The five-second number is not folklore. 121.333(c)(2)(i) defines a quick-donning mask as one that can be placed on the face from its ready position, properly secured, sealed, and supplying oxygen upon demand, with one hand and within five seconds.

Far less than the sea-level-ascent table suggests — a rapid decompression cuts your time of useful consciousness (TUC) by about 50 percent between 25,000 and 43,000 ft. AC 61-107, Figure 2-3 gives TUC both ways:

Above 43,000 ft you are down to the circulation time from lung to brain, roughly 9 to 12 seconds (AC 61-107, para 2-7). And the AC's own warning: TUC is not the onset of unconsciousness — impaired performance may be immediate.

Because nothing commands your attention. AC 61-107 carries the warning twice: "Slow decompression is as dangerous as or more dangerous than a rapid or explosive decompression." A rapid decompression announces itself with noise, fog, and temperature drop; a slow one may go unnoticed and the resulting hypoxia may be unrecognized by the pilot (AC 61-107, para 2-7).

That is the argument for treating the cabin altitude indication and its aural warning as primary instruments in cruise, and for donning oxygen on suspicion rather than on proof.

The AFH sorts them into three families (AFH ch. 18):

• Engine compartment — a failure that lets a flammable substance (fuel, oil, hydraulic fluid) reach a hot surface; mechanical failure of the engine or an accessory, a defective induction or exhaust system, a broken line, or maintenance errors such as improperly fastened fittings
• Electrical — the first indication is usually the distinct odor of burning insulation
• Cabin — careless smoking, electrical system malfunctions, or heating system malfunctions

At transport-category level, add cargo compartment, lavatory, galley, and lithium-battery fires — 121.417(b)(3)(ii) requires training in fire inflight or on the surface and smoke control procedures, with emphasis on electrical equipment.

When intense smoke overwhelms the normal pressurization air system, either depressurize at altitude or execute an emergency descent — depressurizing requires oxygen for all occupants (AFH ch. 18). Be aware that in some airplanes, lowering the landing gear or wing flaps can aggravate a cabin smoke problem (AFH ch. 18) — worth knowing before you configure early "just in case."

121.565(a): whenever an engine fails or is shut down to prevent possible damage, the PIC must land at the nearest suitable airport, in point of time, at which a safe landing can be made.

The exception is narrow. On an airplane with three or more engines, if not more than one engine has failed or been shut down, the PIC may proceed to a selected airport after making a reasonable decision that doing so is as safe as landing at the nearest suitable airport, weighing (121.565(b)) the nature of the malfunction and possible mechanical difficulties, the altitude, weight and usable fuel at shutdown, weather en route and at possible landing points, air traffic congestion, the kind of terrain, and familiarity with the airport. Choosing anything other than the nearest suitable airport triggers a written report in duplicate to the director of operations, forwarded with comments to the responsible Flight Standards office within 10 days of your return to home base (121.565(d)).

You must also report each in-flight engine shutdown to the appropriate communication facility as soon as practicable and keep it fully informed (121.565(c)).

Structure the transmission so the controller can act on the first sentence:

• Who and what — callsign, the nature of the emergency, souls and fuel when asked
• What you want — vectors, a specific runway, a descent, a discrete frequency, equipment standing by
• What you are doing right now — "descending to 10,000, turning left to 270"

Then keep them updated: 121.557(c) obliges you to keep the appropriate ATC facility and dispatch centers fully informed of the progress of the flight. In a crew airplane, the pilot monitoring owns the radio so the pilot flying owns the airplane — the ACS scores the coordination (S4), not the eloquence.

Work the hierarchy rather than the paper:

1. Fly the airplane first — the AFH's warning about engine failures at altitude applies to every emergency: airplanes have been lost "due to apparent fixation on the engine problem to the detriment of flying the airplane" (AFH ch. 13)
2. Handle the failure that is time-critical — fire, smoke, and decompression outrank everything because they have a clock; a hydraulic system loss does not
3. Run memory items for each, then the printed checklists in priority order, watching for steps that conflict (a checklist that wants a system you just isolated)
4. Say the conflict out loud to your crew and resolve it deliberately — the evaluator is assessing task allocation and decision-making, which is exactly what CRM is defined as in Appendix 2
5. When no checklist fits, revert to the AFM limitations and basic systems knowledge, and get the airplane on the ground

R1 is literally "selection of the procedures or checklists to follow in an emergency." Choosing well and saying why is the answer.

Appendix 2 defines CRM as situational awareness, communication skills, teamwork, task allocation, and decision-making within a comprehensive framework of standard operating procedures (FAA-S-ACS-11A, Appendix 2). Practically:

• Positive exchange of controls — the FAA's three-step process: "You have the flight controls," "I have the flight controls," "You have the flight controls," with a visual confirmation (Appendix 2)
• One pilot flies, the other troubleshoots — and the assignment is stated, not assumed
• The evaluator may occupy a required duty position and must perform the CRM functions you brief and request — so brief them (Appendix 2)

One caveat worth knowing: during steep turns, approach to stalls, and recovery from unusual attitudes, the evaluator will not assist, because you must demonstrate control without intervention from the pilot monitoring (Appendix 2).

R4 names distractions, task prioritization, loss of situational awareness, and disorientation, and this task's scenarios are built to produce all four. Fixation is documented: airplanes have been lost "due to apparent fixation on the engine problem to the detriment of flying the airplane" (AFH ch. 13). The countermeasure is the task allocation Appendix 2 defines as CRM — situational awareness is listed first among its components — with one pilot whose whole job stays the flight path, position, and terrain.

The disorientation half is physiological. A decompression means hypoxia, and impaired performance may be immediate (AC 61-107); smoke can obscure the panel; and losing the primary attitude reference in IMC (S3) is the classic spatial disorientation setup. Get on oxygen early, and trust the remaining instruments over body sensations.

They set the floor, the direction, and the clock. Work them in that order:

• Altitude is time. High, you can troubleshoot, run checklists, and choose; low, you fly the airplane and take what is reachable. It is also the constraint on the emergency descent — the AFH has you begin recovery high enough to ensure a safe return to level flight or a precautionary landing (AFH ch. 18).
• Terrain sets the descent target. The level-off altitude for a decompression is the higher of a breathable altitude and a safe one over the terrain along your route — grid MORA, MSA, or the OROCA, not a generic 10,000 ft. In mountainous terrain that may mean an off-airway escape route flown before the descent, which is exactly why the AFM's driftdown and escape procedures exist.
• Wind biases every reachable option. A field or airport downwind is far closer in glide or driftdown terms than the same distance upwind, and the surface wind then sets your touchdown direction and groundspeed.
• Obstructions constrain the last mile — towers, rising ground, and the missed approach you may not be able to fly with a degraded airplane.

Say these out loud as you work the problem. R3 is graded on whether the plan accounts for them, not on whether you name them.

Evacuate when remaining on board is more dangerous than leaving — fire or smoke that cannot be controlled, structural damage, a fuel spill, a ditching, or any condition where the cabin environment is deteriorating. The regulatory backdrop is 121.417(c), and it splits into two different cycles.

Once, during initial training: each crewmember must perform an emergency evacuation drill, egressing the airplane or approved training device using at least one type of installed emergency evacuation slide (121.417(c)(1)(iii)) — a one-time requirement, not a recurrent one.

During initial training and once each 24 calendar months in recurrent training: crewmembers must operate each type of emergency exit in the normal and emergency modes, including the actions and forces required in the deployment of the evacuation slides (121.417(c)(2)(i)(A)), and must observe an emergency evacuation including the use of a slide (121.417(c)(2)(ii)(D)).

That split gets asked. The evacuation drill you perform is one-time; what comes back every 24 calendar months is exit operation and observation.

Related training obligations sit in the same section: 121.417(b) requires instruction in emergency assignments and coordination among crewmembers, in ditching and evacuation equipment, and in handling rapid decompression and inflight fire with smoke control; and 121.417(e) requires crewmembers serving above 25,000 feet to be taught respiration, hypoxia, duration of consciousness without supplemental oxygen at altitude, gas expansion, gas bubble formation, and the phenomena of decompression.

For the oral, describe the decision as a crew product: stop the airplane, set the parking brake, shut down the engines, and give an unambiguous evacuation command on the PA — flight attendants are trained not to act on ambiguity. Consider wind and fire location before choosing exits, and account for everyone once outside.

Leave the conditions — the equipment exists to facilitate escape, not endurance. The AFH is blunt: anti-ice and deice equipment only eliminates ice from the protected surfaces, and significant accumulations may form on unprotected areas even with proper use of the systems (AFH ch. 13). Concretely:

• Change altitude or heading to exit the icing layer; a climb, a descent to above-freezing air, or a turn back to known-clear air are all legitimate — declare and ask
• Add an airspeed margin and use a minimum flap setting on approach, because flap extension increases the AOA of the horizontal stabilizer, and avoid sudden or large configuration and airspeed changes (AFH ch. 13)
• Do not trust the stall warning — pilots should not rely upon stall warning devices for adequate warning with ice accumulations (AFH ch. 13)
• Consider disconnecting the autopilot — continuous autopilot use masks the trim and handling changes that reveal ice accumulation, and it disconnects suddenly at its design limits, handing you an airplane with unsatisfactory handling characteristics (AFH ch. 13)

And the limitation that ends the argument: no multiengine airplane is approved for flight into severe icing conditions, and none are intended for indefinite flight in continuous icing (AFH ch. 13).

The instrument scan changes; the tolerances do not. Fly by reference to standby flight instruments, backup instrumentation, or partial panel as appropriate to the situation (VII.A S3), while still meeting the numeric standards of whatever task you are flying — assume your instrument-rating partial-panel technique is intact. What the ATP adds is the crew dimension:

• Announce the failure and the degraded state
• Transfer control if the standby instruments are better positioned in front of the other seat
• Ask ATC for a longer final or a lower workload routing
• Configure the autopilot and flight director to a mode you can still verify

A flight director driven by a failed source is worse than no flight director.